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The past decade has witnessed a marked increase in the use of social media by politicians,
most notably exemplified by the 45th President of the United States (POTUS), Donald Trump.
On Twitter, POTUS messages consistently attract high levels of engagement as measured by
likes, retweets, and replies. Here, we quantify the balance of these activities, also known as
“ratios”, and study their dynamics as a proxy for collective political engagement in response
to presidential communications. We find that raw activity counts increase during the period
leading up to the 2016 election, accompanied by a regime change in the ratio of retweets-to-replies
connected to the transition between campaigning and governing. For the Trump account, we
find words related to fake news and the Mueller inquiry are more common in tweets with a
high number of replies relative to retweets. Finally, we find that Barack Obama consistently
received a higher retweet-to-reply ratio than Donald Trump. These results suggest Trump’s Twitter
posts are more often controversial and subject to enduring engagement as a given news cycle unfolds.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability for US presidents to communicate directly
with the public changed dramatically during the 20th
and early 21st centuries. Moving from Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s famous fireside chats through the television
addresses of Harry Truman and John F. Kennedy, we
now find ourselves in the era of social media campaigns
and presidencies [1]. Communication technology has es-
pecially accelerated the ability for presidents to “go pub-
lic” [2] and make appeals directly and instantly to the
electorate.
With its introduction in the 2000s, social media pro-
vided a new platform for direct communication. New
mechanisms for information sharing have consequences
for contagion: rapid spreading of content through a user-
base capable of responding in real-time. While these plat-
forms democratize sharing for many categories of indi-
viduals on social media (e.g., celebrities interacting with
fans), US presidential accounts present a unique oppor-
tunity to analyze particularly salient signals indicative
of broader sociotechnical phenomena in an increasingly
prominent aspect of politics.
Advertisers and political campaigns alike are con-
cerned with engagement metrics for social media posts.
Twitter itself markets its data as an early warning sys-
tem for customer satisfaction and reputation manage-
ment [3]—although the company has recently banned po-
litical advertising [4]. The rate with which a given post
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garners interactions (e.g., clicks, profile views, mouse-
hovers, etc.) is a common measure of engagement in
the digital realm. Activities in response to social me-
dia posts include retweets/shares, likes/favorites, and
replies/comments. These activities all reflect specific user
actions such as endorsing a post or expressing a divergent
opinion. Some have theorized that simple ratios of activ-
ities may be used as proxies for of the polarity of the
public’s response to a given message [5, 6].
The term ‘ratioed’ is a Merriam-Webster “word we’re
watching” [7]. On Twitter, the ratio value is generally
taken to be defined by the ratio or balance of replies
to likes or retweets. Here we will focus on the ratio of
retweets to replies, as we show that like volume is often
stable, while replies and retweets seem more reflective of
specific public responses (Sec. III).
In an effort to explore the dynamics of ratio space,
in 2017 the website FiveThirtyEight Politics presented
ternary ratios with activity counts normalized across
retweets, comments, and likes [8]. Using this metric, the
authors compared US politicians based on the ratio val-
ues their tweets receive. This work found noteworthy
differences between politicians and political parties. As
of late 2017, Trump tweets tended to be met with rela-
tively more replies, while Obama tweets were met with
relatively more retweets. Tweets for both presidents had
a high value of normalized activities that were likes. Be-
yond presidents, FiveThirtyEight Politics compared re-
sponses to the tweets of Republican and Democratic sen-
ators. The senatorial accounts exhibited normalized re-
sponse values largely reflective of their party’s most re-
cent president—Republican senators tended to have high
values of normalized reply activities while Democratic
senators had more retweets and likes.
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2Figure 1. Time series for the cumulative sum of retweet and reply activities for four tweets authored by
the Trump account after the 2016 presidential election. The temporal axis is logarithmically spaced to show early-stage
growth. Insets represent the cumulative ratio of Nretweets/Nreplies for the same time period. Vertical lines with H, D,
W, M correspond to hour, day, week, and month intervals. Triangles indicate inflection points where the second deriva-
tive of retweet volume transitions from positive to negative (see Sec. III B and Fig. 6). The tweets examined here only
provide some illustrative examples of how response activity time series behave. Direct links to tweets for panel (A):
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/914269704440737792, panel (B): https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/1128051913419837442, panel (C): https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/968468176639004672, and panel
(D): https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/810996052241293312. Tweet screenshots were collected on May 28,
2020.
More broadly speaking, time series of Twitter response
activities have been used to investigate the relationship
between on- and off-line political activity by analyzing
correlations between current events and trends in cumu-
lative activity sums [9]. Fundamental models relating
retweet activity to external activity have been proposed
at the hour and day scale for the 2012 South Korean
presidential election [10]. Kobayashi and Lambiotte find
future retweet activity to be log-linear correlated with
early tweet levels [11]. Outside of Twitter, analysis of
Instagram posts immediately preceding the 2016 US pres-
idential election showed a higher volume of user activity
for Trump supporters as well as more intense pro-Trump
activity at the sub-day time-scale when compared to pro-
Clinton posts [12].
Twitter specifically has been identified as playing an
active role in the political arena as evidenced by stud-
ies of improved social organization during the Arab
Spring [13, 14], disinformation campaigns during the
2016 US presidential election [15–17], and political co-
hesion on the platform [18, 19]. Twitter has been shown
to be a valuable source for data pertaining to domestic
protests and social movements in the US [20–22]. The
2016 US presidential election in particular has been ex-
tensively analyzed through the lens of Twitter data [23–
26]. There is also increasing academic interest in the
unique communication style of President Trump on Twit-
ter [27, 28].
Twitter been used to study several large-scale socio-
technical phenomena such as the stock market [29, 30]
and medical research [31, 32]. Messages on the platform
have been shown to have a relationship with presidential
3approval rating polls [33–38]. Wang et al. examine how
likes on Twitter can identify the preferences of Trump-
account followers [39]. Although noisy at times, Twitter
data can provide valuable insights on how audiences and
populations respond to current events and specific mes-
saging.
Information diffusion and cascades on Twitter and
other social networks has been the topic of much re-
search [40–44]. Beyond politics on Twitter, Candia et
al. propose a bi-exponential model to describe collective
attention for online videos and manuscripts [45]. Me-
dia coverage of major events has been found to decay
on roughly a weekly cycle, and scaling superlinearly with
the population size of the affected area [46]. Amati et al.
model retweet actions on dynamic and cumulative activ-
ity networks [47] while ten Thij et al. identify retweet
graph characteristics common among viral content [48].
Some researchers have proposed critical levels of activ-
ity required to trigger information cascades on Twitter
in light of tweet characteristics [49]. Others have pro-
posed more general cascade requirements on social net-
works [50]. Jin et al. investigate how messages cross
language and state communities on the platform [51].
Lee et al. predict retweet volume based on prior retweet
spacing, user meta-data, tweet content [52]. Others have
identified celebrity-users (including Barack Obama) that
are central in spreading new content [53].
Regarding the representativeness of social media data,
several studies have examined the degree to which Twit-
ter represents the general population and voting pub-
lic [54–57]. Grinberg et al. investigate fake news ex-
posure for Twitter accounts belonging to eligible voters
and found disproportionate exposure to a small number
of accounts [58].
How likely are Twitter users, and specifically POTUS
account followers, to be eligible voters in the US? Pew
Research Center has estimated that 26% and 19% of
US adults follow the Obama and Trump accounts, re-
spectively [59]. The New York Times estimated however
that less than 20% of Trump’s followers are voting-age
US citizens [60]. These considerations are important to
remember when attempting to establish a relationship
between Twitter metrics and political outcomes. Never-
theless, the platform has been shown to be a powerful
tool for evaluating public sentiment towards politicians,
and even detecting adversarial actions in the US political
process.
Presidential communications are a timely topic in light
of rapidly changing norms surrounding how the executive
branch communicates with the public. Moreover, highly
influential Twitter users such as US presidents produce
signals in the medium that largely transcend the social
network dynamics. When a president tweets, the message
is nearly instantly amplified and spread by official and
unofficial sources on the platform. Indeed, US presidents
are often discussed at rates approaching function words
on Twitter [61]. Examining ultrafamous users somewhat
removes the more prominent effects of network topology
on the response activity and provides an opportunity to
view response behavior largely as a function of timing
and message content.
The volume of response activities on Twitter is ar-
guably the most tangible metric that is publicly avail-
able for evaluating user-base responses to content on the
platform. Furthermore, these values are highly visible
to users and may influence behavior when users seek to
affect the collective response to a communication (e.g.,
‘take a stand’ by responding [62]). Establishing charac-
teristic scales of activity volume and temporal dynamics
for engagement is an important step in understanding
how these values can provide insights on user-base re-
sponse.
Counts of user activities responding to tweets can be
readily viewed through the icons at the bottom of every
tweet, which also provide the interface for user engage-
ment. These values provide the end user with an indi-
cation of the tweet popularity and, in some cases, con-
troversiality. Taken together with the cultural context
surrounding the original tweet, the ratio of these values
open up the possibility of studying tweets through the
lens of “ratiometrics”. This allows for the distillation of
response activities into aggregated measures of the user
base’s reaction. Moreover, enables the comparison of re-
sponse activities on Twitter across accounts and across
time. From there, we can begin to use the ratio values
as a criteria when evaluating the content of tweets.
A simple calculation of the publicly accessible response
activity counts is a starting point, but insufficient to fully
investigate the full potential of ratiometrics. Here we
present a suite of tools—collectively referred to as the
“ratiometer”—that help us understand response activ-
ity profiles for tweets. Many factors contribute to inter-
preting the activity counts for a tweet, including typical
activity ratios for the user and the age of the tweet. Un-
derstanding the typical response that an account receives
requires building a historical view of the user’s tweets and
their subsequent response activities. Another challenge is
determining the typical response volume at a given time
step since the tweet was issued.
We show example time series for retweets and replies in
response to four Trump tweets authored after the 2016
election in Fig. 1. In the case of an ultra-famous user
like Trump, we see an immediate response to tweets with
early retweets and replies occurring seconds after the
original tweet. For Trump’s tweets from after the 2016
election, we generally observe thousands of response ac-
tivities within the quarter-hour, with response-activity
counts nearing their final values within 24-hours of the
original tweet. There may be modest growth during the
proceeding week, but generally these values have stabi-
lization periods at the day-scale (Figs. S1 and S2). The
insets in Fig. 1 show the retweet-to-reply ratio time se-
ries. These values often fluctuate even while individual
ratio time series appear to have a more stable trend. The
above highlights some of the challenges in building an
understanding for the expected volume and time scale
4associated with response activities for a specific account.
In the present study, we explore the time series of
the volume of user activities in response to presiden-
tial tweets. We summarize the ratio values of responses
to Obama and Trump tweets over three distinct peri-
ods of recent US political history. Our investigation in-
cludes ratio values for all three activity counts normal-
ized against the sum of all activities (we refer to these
as ternary ratios below). We also present characteristic
time scales for response activity volume over the three
political periods for both presidents. Finally, we present
words that tend to appear more often in ratioed tweets
for the @realDonaldTrump account. In section II, we
describe our data and methodology. In section III, we
present and discuss the results of our study. Finally, in
section IV, we offer concluding remarks and point to ar-
eas for future work.
II. METHODS
A. Data
We construct the dataset analyzed in the present study
by filtering Twitter’s Decahose Streaming API [63] an, in
principle, random 10% sample of tweets authored since
2009. The stream contains a variety of activity types in-
cluding tweets, retweets, quote tweets, and replies. While
the Twitter REST API serves up-to-date information for
a given user or activity, the Streaming API data offers a
snapshot of each activity at the moment of generation.
The specific form of this dataset allows us to create a
historical timeline of activities; responses to each origi-
nal activity arrive with timestamped counts for several
metrics including replies, likes, and retweets. For the
purposes of this study, we define ‘activity’ to refer to any
user action recorded in the historical sample including
original tweets, retweets, retweets with comments, and
replies.
Given the sampling rate of the Decahose API, each
individual activity has an approximately 10% chance of
appearing in our data set. For popular users and tweets
(i.e., tweets that garner retweets and replies that num-
ber in the thousands or more), we are almost certain
to record activities responding to the original activity.
Moreover, we are able to observe a number of activities
with sufficient temporal resolution to construct historical
time series down to the level of a single second.
B. Tracking Retweets and Replies
Starting with the 10% random sample of Twitter ac-
tivities, we collect activities responding to presidential
tweets by filtering for replies and retweets responding to
the @BarackObama and @realDonaldTrump accounts.
We do not include the official US Presidential Twitter
account (@POTUS) or the official White House account
(@WhiteHouse). The random sample feed serves original
tweets, retweets, and replies. Each of these activities are
served in a tweet object that contains metadata which
includes creation time and follower counts for the author
of the activity. In the case of retweets, the tweet ob-
ject contains a count of retweets and likes at the moment
the activity is retweeted. Replies are tagged with user
metadata and time of activity. Altogether, the metadata
provides the historical data allowing construction of the
response activity timeline.
C. Measuring the Ratio
While retweets counts are observable via tweet meta-
data, replies must be gathered by maintaining a cumula-
tive summation of reply activity counts (multiplying the
final value by 10 to account for our sample rate). Vali-
dating these estimates for final reply values, we find the
error to be less than 1% in terms of actual/predicted re-
ply counts for high activity tweets. In order to calculate
the ratio at a common time step, we linearly interpolate
the values for replies, retweets, and favorites, resulting
in time series that can be sampled at arbitrary intervals
for all activity types. We report time steps at the second
resolution unless otherwise stated.
There are several challenges associated with the histor-
ical feed, stemming from contradicting metadata on ac-
tivity objects that occurred simultaneously. With times-
tamps at the 1 second resolution, sometimes tweet activi-
ties are reported as occurring at the same time (inferring
time stamps from Twitter snowflake IDs did not resolve
these conflicts [64]). Activities that reportedly occur at
the same time often have conflicting values for retweets
and likes (sometimes differing by hundreds of activities).
This may be due the count values growing so quickly that
the activities within a given second window have differing
values and/or it may be an artifact of the slow update
times within the platform’s database. This latter point
is made more notable when taken in combination with
Twitter’s practice of deleting millions of tweets per week
(this would lead to fluctuations in the activity counts for
a given tweet).
Regardless of the cause, fluctuations in activity counts
result in time series that increase non-monotonically. To
make model fitting and data analysis easier, we remove
observations that result in non-monotonically increasing
behavior before the maximum value of the activity time
series. When calculating first and second derivatives we
use a Gaussian filter to smooth the time series so that
we avoid incorrectly identifying noisy regions as notable
transitions from positive to negative derivatives. There is
decay in values for retweets while replies only increase—
the exact reasons for the decay are not investigated here,
but the lack of decay in the replies is due to the cumu-
lative sum method we use for estimating reply values.
There is further work to be conducted on the possibility
that these jagged portions are a signal of banned account
5activity, and the dynamics of the jagged regions may in-
dicate activity by accounts that the platform ultimately
deems ban-worthy.
Ternary activity values are calculated by dividing each
activity count by the sum of all activities at a given time
step. The ternary ratio value for activity type τ at time
step t is given by
Rτ (t) = Nτ (t)
Nretweets(t) +Nlikes(t) +Nreplies(t)
, (1)
where Nτ (t) is the count of the activity at time step t.
With the above each observation is comprised of a 3-
dimensional vector representing the normalized activity
values for a tweet.
The ternary ratio values are represented on a ternary
plot (2-dimensional simplex) where the values of activi-
ties at each time step sum to 1,
∑
τ
Rτ (t) = 1 . (2)
D. Vocabulary of Ratioed Tweets
We are also interested in how the text content of tweets
relates to ratios of response activities. To investigate this
we calculate rank turbulence divergence—as defined by
Dodds et al.—between ratioed and non-ratioed tweets
[65].
The rank turbulence divergence between two sets, Ω1
and Ω2, is calculated as follows,
DRα (Ω1||Ω2) =
∑
δDRα,τ
=
α+ 1
α
∑
τ
∣∣∣∣∣ 1rατ,1 − 1rατ,2
∣∣∣∣∣
1/(α+1)
,
(3)
where rτ,s is the rank of element τ (n-grams in our case)
in system s and α is a tunable parameter that affects the
impact of starting and ending ranks.
Here, we take the content of tweets from the Trump ac-
count after his declaration of candidacy on June 16, 2015.
We then split this set by ratioed (Nretweets/Nreplies < 1 )
and non-ratioed tweets (Nretweets/Nreplies > 1). Obama’s
account did not have a sufficient number of ratioed tweets
to conduct this analysis. From here we calculate the rank
divergence, between the two sets. We set α = 1/3 based
on experimentation outlined in the original rank diver-
gence piece by Dodds et al. This value of alpha tends to
balance the influence of high- and low-ranked items.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Overall time series
Viewing replies, retweets, and likes for individual
tweets over time, we see how activities in response to
Trump and Obama tweets have changed in the years
around the 2016 election. In Fig. 2, we show the final
count (the activity volume 168 hours after the original
tweet is authored) of activities for each tweet in the PO-
TUS data set. Then-candidate Trump’s tweets experi-
enced a notable increase in response activity following
his June 16, 2015 declaration of candidacy. Prior to this
point, Trump’s tweets garnered 2 to 3 orders of magni-
tude less activities than during the height of his campaign
and his subsequent time in office.
Because of the difficulty in sampling replies using our
data (see Sec. II for tweets that receive few replies), many
of the tweets from the Trump account from before his
candidacy have a high degree of uncertainty in their true
value. This uncertainty is introduced by our method for
inferring reply counts introduces variance in the overall
activity balance.
In Fig. 3 we present the normalized activity values for
tweets from Obama and Trump from 2013 to 2019. The
ternary histrograms allow us to compare all activity val-
ues, while the time series in Fig. 3D and Fig. 3H show
the retweet-to-reply ratio. We choose the latter as it
appears to offer a more descriptive measure of response
activities (i.e., counts of likes are generally more stable
within sub-regions of the yearly time series). The Obama
Nretweets/Nreplies time series (Fig. 3D) demonstrates how
the Obama account tends to receive more retweets than
replies (median ratio value of 3.67 between June 6, 2015
and November 8, 2016).
Once Obama leaves office, the account receives con-
sistently more retweets than replies on the limited num-
ber of tweets authored (median ratio value of 7.77 after
November 8, 2016).
The Trump Nretweets/Nreplies time series (Fig. 3H)
shows the tendency of then-candidate Trump’s account
to be ratioed less during the campaign season. Soon after
transitioning to office the Trump account begins receiv-
ing more replies relative to retweets—with a transition
period roughly corresponding to the time between the
day of the election and inauguration. For the campaign
period Trump has a median ratio value of 3.1 while after
the election the account garners a median ratio value of
1.32.
In Fig. 3E we show a ternary histogram for the pre-
campaign Trump account, where the high variance in re-
ply estimates are evidenced by broad coverage of most
regions of the simplex. Error in estimating replies alone
does not account for this high variance, with the like and
retweet time series from Fig. 2 showing higher variance
for Trump as well. Another time series artifact is the
presence of Trump tweets that were met with low activ-
ity counts around the 2016 election. Around the same
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Figure 2. Time series histogram of maximum activity counts for tweets posted from the Barack Obama (A–C) and
Donald Trump (D–F) Twitter accounts. Each bin represents a collection of tweets at their original author date along with their
respective maximum observed activity count. Bins with less than 2 tweets are shown as grey dots. We include all tweet types
(e.g., advertisements, promoted, etc.); see Section II for information on collection methods. We annotate Trump’s declaration
of candidacy and the 2016 US general election with solid vertical grey bars. A marked decrease in Obama account activity is
apparent immediately following the 2016 election. The region of outliers in the Trump time series immediately preceding the
2016 election has been determined to be largely reflective of promoted tweets which have abnormal circulation dynamics on
the platform [66].
time, the Obama account activity drops precipitously.
After the election, Obama’s limited number of tweets
are met with consistently high counts of likes, retweets,
and replies. The rapid increase in activities in response
to Trump tweets, and the corresponding decrease in the
overall variance of counts for activities, are important in-
sights visible in Fig. 2. These measures are indicative of
the meteoric rise of then candidate Trump, along with his
now pre-eminent Twitter presence (his name now appears
more frequently than the word “god” on most days [61]).
While the two time periods are not directly comparable,
by the end of the 2016 election, Trump’s account consis-
tently garnered more response activities than President
Obama’s. After the 2016 election, the Obama account’s
tweeting frequency is reduced while also experiencing a
notable rise in response activities. These results helped
inform the selection of distinct periods around the 2016
election. These time periods were both meaningful in a
political context—marking Trump’s declaration of candi-
dacy and the 2016 election day—as well as in the context
of response activity time series.
B. Example Ternary Time Series
Using observations of responses to historical tweets, we
can construct the time series for all ratios of activities.
In Fig. 4 we show the ratio time series for three Trump
tweets. We selected the tweets based on the value of
their final retweet-to-reply ratio—with a tweet from ap-
proximately the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles of final
Nretweets/Nreplies ratio values. The response activities to
most tweets (with high response activity) tend to experi-
ence some early volatility, partially owing to the low num-
ber of observations. One hour after the original tweet has
been authored, the response ratios tend to fall into a sta-
ble region, or at least adopt a stable trend. Within this
signal there is also the effect of bots that are likely pro-
grammed to respond to Trump account activity within
seconds.
We show how ratios tend to stabilize by presenting
ternary histograms of activity response ratios over the
seconds and days after a tweet is published. Fig. S1 shows
how the Obama account largely has ratios biased towards
retweets and likes throughout the period after a tweet is
authored. Ratios for the Trump account (Fig. S2) tend
to have greater variance in their ratio values in the sec-
7Figure 3. Ternary histograms and Nretweets/Nreplies ratio time series for the @BarackObama (A–D) and
@realDonaldTrump (E–H) Twitter accounts. The ternary histograms (A–C and E–H) represent the count of retweet, favorite,
and reply activities normalized by the sum of all activities. White regions indicate no observations over the given time period.
See Fig. 4 for examples of full time series for response activity for example tweets. Heatmap time series (D and H) consist of
monthly bins representing the density of tweets with a given ratio value. Single observations (bin counts < 2) are represented
by grey points. The two dates annotated correspond to the date of Trump’s declaration of candidacy (2015− 05− 16) and the
2016 general election (2016−11−09). We show the tendency for Trump tweets to have ternary ratio values with a greater reply
component—with pre-candidacy tweets having higher variability and pre-election tweets having a higher Nretweets/Nreplies ratio
value. Post-election Obama tweets have ternary ratio values with more likes than other periods for both Obama and Trump.
Screenshots were collected on May 28, 2020.
8Figure 4. Ternary time series for three popular Trump tweets, selected to represent messages in approximately the upper
90th percentile, 50th percentile, and bottom 10th percentile of Nretweets/Nreplies ratios. The time series represent observations
from first activity observation to the final observation of the tweet. These ternary time series contrast the simple 2-dimensional
ratio trajectories and illustrate example trajectories through the 3-dimensional ratio space. See Fig. S1 and Fig. S2 for the
distribution of ternary ratio values for Obama and Trump tweets over time. Each of these three tweets were authored on May
25, 2019. Direct links to tweets for panels (A–D) https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1097116612279316480,
panels (E–H) https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1155657137076527104, and panels (I–L) https://twitter.
com/realDonaldTrump/status/1159083364965654528. Screenshots were collected on May 28, 2020.
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Figure 5. Histogram of final observed ratios for tweets
authored by @BarackObama and @realDonaldTrump
accounts. Observations left of the dashed vertical line cor-
respond to tweets that are considered ratioed. The shift
in the distribution corresponding to Trump’s account can
be plainly seen—with the account producing more tweets
that are ratioed than compared with Obama’s account. For
both accounts, tweets shown here are restricted to those au-
thored after Trump’s declaration of candidacy. Of 16,708
tweets included from the Trump account, 3,015 (18%) have a
log10Nretweets/Nreplies value less than or equal to 0 and 13,693
(82%) have a score greater than 0. Of 1,786 tweets from the
Obama account, 7 (< 1% have log10Nretweets/Nreplies values
≤ 0 while 1,779 (> 99%) have values > 0. From the distri-
bution of ratio values we see that ratioed tweets are outliers
for the Obama account while the Trump account often gets
ratioed and has a lower ratio value on average.
onds and hours after a tweet is released. The ratios for
Trump’s account are also biased towards more replies,
relative to the Obama account, throughout the period
after issuing a tweet. This is consistent with the final ra-
tio values for each president across three political periods
surrounding the 2016 election.
C. Distribution of Ratios
The final observed ratio value for a tweet offers an
aggregate measure of user-base reactions. We exam-
ine tweets which were authored at least 168 hours prior
to the activity calculation to ensure the responses have
largely stabilized. Of course, there is still the possibil-
ity that users will respond to the tweet long after the
original activity period, but we have found these lagging
response activities to minimally affect the normalized ra-
tio value. It is worth noting that this delayed response
behavior is common for prominent users such as Obama
and Trump, with some response activities taking place
months or years after the original activity (often in ref-
erence to current events that are addressed in the old
tweet: ‘there is always a tweet’).
In Fig. 5 we show the distribution of Trump and
Obama Nretweets/Nreplies ratios, highlighting the ten-
dency for the Trump account to “get ratioed” more of-
ten relative to the Obama account. Of 13,639 tweets in
Fig. 5 from the Trump account, 18% receive more replies
than retweets. The Obama account generates a relatively
limited number of tweets that receive more replies than
retweets (less than 1%). This simple ratio calculated with
two of the three activity measures loses some context in
terms of overall user-base responses, and we now move
to incorporate the like activity volumes.
We subset the tweets for Presidents Obama and Trump
based on the time periods introduced in Fig. 2. In Fig. 3
we show that for both Obama and Trump accounts there
is a higher degree of variation in final ternary ratio values
for earlier years. This is likely in part due to the reply
thread mechanisms and structure changing on Twitter’s
platform, as well as the growing popularity of political
accounts on Twitter, aside from background changes in
how users engage on the platform. This shift is especially
prominent for the Trump account, which experienced a
marked growth in response activity after Trump’s dec-
laration of candidacy. The higher variance of final ratio
values is accentuated when the sample of replies is lower,
owing to our method of estimating reply activities. Com-
paring Obama and Trump ternary histograms (Fig. 3) we
observe more Trump activity ratios in the reply region of
the simplex.
For the Obama account, Figs. 3A–D, we see notably
higher values for normalized retweet and like activity
compared with the Trump account. The retweet-to-reply
ratio is consistently higher in the time series presented in
Fig. 3D. Once leaving office, the Obama account demon-
strated a further tendency to receive a higher proportion
of likes and retweets.
D. Characteristic Time Scale
To empirically investigate the characteristic time scale
of response activities, we find points where the second
derivative of retweet counts drops below 0,
d2
dt2
Nretweets(ti−1) > 0 and
d2
dt2
Nretweet(ti) < 0 . (4)
These points are viewed as being indicative of response
activity starting to wane or ‘roll-over’ as the rate at which
new activities are generated decreases. Going forward we
will refer to these points as inflection points (examples
of these points can be seen with triangular markers in
Fig. 1).
When viewing time since an original tweet in Fig. 6,
we see a higher density of inflection points around the
1 minute and 1 day time intervals. This suggests that
many periods of intense activity take place within the
first day of a tweet being authored. We also observe in-
flection points in cases where more sporadic engagement
occurs later in the tweet response-activity timeline. This
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Figure 6. Distribution of inflection points, where d
2
dt2
Nretweets(ti−1) > 0 and d
2
dt2
Nretweet(ti) < 0 . A and E: Example
cumulative retweet time series and inflection points (solid triangles) for Obama and Trump tweets. Histograms show the
distribution of inflection points across all tweets binned by time periods before (B and F), during (C and G), and after (D
and H) the 2016 US presidential election campaign. The January 1st 2009 to June 15th 2015 period for Trump (F) contains
inflection point counts that are largely reflective of low initial activity and high(er) late activity (months or years later)
leading to unusually high values for seconds to first inflection point (> 108 seconds). For Obama’s and Trump’s time in office,
tweets experience inflection points around 1-minute and 1-day after the tweet is authored—indicating characteristic time-scales
of activity waning. Direct links for Obama tweet (A): https://twitter.com/BarackObama/status/693571153336496128 and
Trump tweet (E): https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1090729920760893441. Screenshots were collected on May
28, 2020.
leads to another spike in activity around 1 week after the
original tweet. Over 90% of inflection points are observed
before 105 seconds (∼ 1.15 days) for both accounts and
for all time periods as evidenced by complementary cu-
mulative distribution functions (see Fig. 7).
There is a notable difference between the governing
periods for Obama and Trump, Figs. 6A and 6G, re-
spectively. Trump tweet response time lines demonstrate
a tendency to generate inflection points before the 1-
minute mark—indicative of rapid response to his ac-
count’s tweets. Additionally, we find more time series
inflection points after 1-week has passed for the Trump
time series than compared with Obama. This suggests
that users may return to Trump tweets later to comment
on the content (perhaps as new political developments oc-
cur). This is further illustrated in Fig. 7B, where we show
that 10% of Trump inflection points take place after 106
seconds (∼ 10 days). This is true for the pre-campaign,
campaigning, and governing periods. By contrast, 90%
of Obama inflection points take place before 105 seconds
(∼ 1 day).
E. Ratio Content
We can investigate how tweet content relates to re-
sponse activities by comparing the distributions of words
that appear in ratioed and non-ratioed tweets. Taking
the rank of the frequency of occurrence for each group,
we then compare the rank-turbulence divergence for the
two groups [65]. Per the allotaxonograph in Fig. 8, we
are able to tune the impact of starting and ending rank
magnitude on the overall score for the word.
In Fig. 8, we show that ratioed tweets contain more
words related to fake news, the Mueller inquiry into
Russian interference, and Colin Kaepernick and kneel-
ing during the national anthem in the National Football
League (NFL). For non-ratioed tweets, we see words from
campaign-related communications (e.g., “Jeb”, “Iowa”,
and “VOTE”) tend to appear more often than in ratioed
tweets. The imbalance of word counts in the ratioed and
non-ratioed tweets is roughly proportional to the tweet
imbalance with 22.9% of words occurring in the ratioed
tweets. Of all unique words, nearly twice as many occur
once or more in the non-ratioed tweets compared to the
ratioed tweets.
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Figure 7. Complementary cumulative distribution
function for inflection point timing. Roughly 90% of
Obama inflection points (A) took place before 105 seconds
(∼ 1 day) for the period before the 2016 election cycle. For
the period during and after the 2016 campaign season, both
Obama and Trump tweets (B) recieve 10% of inflection points
after roughly 106 seconds (∼ 10 days) from the initial tweet.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have considered how both the volume and kind
of user activities in response to US presidents on Twitter
varies over multiple time scales. We found the Trump ac-
count to have greater variability in the normalized ratio
of activities—including a tendency to receive more replies
relative to likes and retweets than when compared to
the Obama account. Obama’s tendency to receive more
retweets and likes was only amplified after his departure
from public office. We found that in ratioed tweets au-
thored by Trump, words pertaining to fake news, the
Mueller inquiry, and the NFL are more common than
in non-ratioed tweets. We also showed more general re-
sults for response activity profiles, with responses to the
two Twitter presidents often stabilizing around the 1-day
scale. The Trump account also experiences more activity
fluctuations after 1-week than compared to the Obama
account, perhaps owing to users more often returning to
Trump’s comments as political actions unfold.
How the public responds to messages over the course
of a politician’s career is a fundamental dynamic in pol-
itics. As candidates rise to prominence and are elected
to office, the reach and importance of their communica-
tion changes. Further, the rapid proliferation of digital
technology provides a backdrop of constant evolution in
political communications. Response activity by users on
social media provides a valuable set of features for gaug-
ing how social networks respond to political messaging.
Beyond simple counts, response time series dynamics pro-
vide insight into the characteristics of political engage-
ment. This includes determining when activity counts
stabilize, detecting non-human user behavior, and per-
haps establishing how polarized push-and-pull dynam-
ics play out in response to messages. When combined
with more conventional natural language processing tech-
niques, these “ratiometrics” hold promise in improving
our understanding of how specific messaging (e.g., word
choice) affects user responses.
This study was not able to control for background
changes in the Twitter interface—changes to the man-
ner in which retweets are served could have effects on
the response profiles. Further, there are some types of
posts—namely “promoted” or “ad” posts—that have dif-
ferent distribution characteristics (i.e. may be viewed by
a more targeted, limited audience). We were not able
to fully filter these posts and they were included in the
analysis.
Twitter is a constantly changing system, and this is
especially true for the nature of political discourse on
the platform. While we make efforts here to highlight
some notable exogenous events, we cannot control for
background flux of user-engagement with politics. Sim-
ple changes that may be occurring include shifts in the
distribution of users from across the political spectrum
(i.e., more left- or right-leaning user activity) or more
subtle changes in content (e.g., more spam and less in-
depth conversation).
With social media playing such a prominent roll in
today’s political process, it is our goal that the meth-
ods presented here can contribute to a broader suite of
instruments for analyzing political communication in the
digital realm. This is the first piece of an effort to system-
atically evaluate the communications of US presidents on
Twitter. Building from our understanding of ratiomet-
rics, the “POTUSometer” is envisioned as sitting along-
side instruments such as the Hedonometer [67] (which
provides a measurement of collective sentiment on Twit-
ter). The POTUSometer would tap into the ‘wisdom of
the crowd’ (or at least the reality of collective responses)
in order to evaluate and better understand how presi-
dents speak and are listened to on social media platforms.
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Figure 8. Rank divergence allotaxonograph [65] for 1-grams from Trump account tweets authored after Trump’s declaration
of his candidacy on June 16, 2015. “Ratioed” tweets are those where the proportion of retweets over replies is less than 1
(Nretweets/Nreplies < 1), non-ratioed tweets accumulated a ratio greater than 1 (Nretweets/Nreplies > 1). There is a notable class
imbalance. The majority of tweets are non-ratioed, with a median value of ∼ 2. To generate the above figure we examined
3,313 ratioed tweets and 15,274 non-ratioed tweets. The 1-grams “Fake”, “News”, “Russia” and “NFL” are ranked higher in
the ratioed corpus. For the non-ratioed corpus, the 1-grams “Jeb”, “Carolina”, and “Ted” are ranked higher. This illustrates
the tendency of ratioed tweets from this period to contain more politically contentious 1-grams related to Trump scandals.
Non-ratioed tweets from this period more often contain campaign related messages.
Future research could explore how the sentiment
changes with response activities (commented retweets
and replies). Similarly, topic modelling could be used
to explore which subjects are discussed throughout the
response activity time line. A more sophisticated null
model for the ternary ratio values (and ratio time series)
would be worthwhile to enable anomaly detection. There
would be further work in the area of researching atten-
tion reinforcement along with analyses of time series sta-
bility. With recent advancements in language modelling,
text regression on tweet content in order to predict ratio
scores may be worthy of investigation. Finally, replicat-
ing this work across a broad base of users beyond Obama
and Trump would better inform how certain social net-
work attributes effect the above results.
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V. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
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Figure S1. Snapshots of ternary activity ratio values for tweets in response to the Obama account. Observations
are recorded at logarithmically spaced intervals after the release of the original tweet. Included here are 3,015 tweets from the
period of time after Trump’s declaration of candidacy on June 16, 2015. Whereas Fig. 3 shows a final ratio value for tweets
over distinct political periods, here we show how ratios unfold over the life of each tweet. This is serves as a snapshot of the
ternary ratio time series presented in Fig. 4. Obama’s tweets tend to receive a greater volume of likes and retweets relative to
replies, and this ratio is often maintained throughout the response timeline.
S3
Figure S2. Snapshots of ternary activity ratios for tweets in response to the Trump account. Observations are
recorded at logarithmically spaced intervals after the release of the original tweet. Included here are 16,708 tweets from the
period of time after Trump’s declaration of candidacy on June 16, 2015. Whereas Fig. 3 shows a final ratio value for tweets
over distinct political periods, here we show how ratios unfold over the life of each tweet. This is serves as a snapshot of the
ternary ratio time series presented in Fig. 4. We can see the greater variation in ternary ratio values compared to the snapshots
for Obama (Fig. S1). There is also a greater tendency for tweets to have higher reply counts when compared to the Obama
snapshots.
